Resettlement and Rehabilitation

The resettlement and rehabilitation policies have been the most contentious aspect of the SSP controversy. The inadequacies of these policies were really what sparked the social justice movements that the Narmada River has become famous for. Skeptism around these policies largely caused the radical shift in the movements, as discussed in my earlier post, from protesting rehabilitation plans to outright protesting dam construction.

Currently, a federal rehabilitation and resettlement policy does not exist. Rather, these sets of policies are determined by state governments. This is, to some degree, beneficial given that the size and scale of all the dam projects are all so different. A blanket federal policy on resettlement and rehabilitation could not necessarily account for such variability.

Current rehabilitation and resettlement policies for the SSP, according to the NVDA, are as follows:

Compensation of agricultural land – Agricultural land will be compensated as per sec. 23 of Land Acquisition Act (market value of the Land Compensation of wells, pipelines & trees as per valuation report given by PHE, forest and Horticulture Deptts. + 30% solatium+12% interest.

Compensation of houses and properties – Compensation of houses and other immovable properties will be paid as per section 23 of Land Acquisition Act (as per CSR) + 30% solatium + 12% interest

Rehabilitation grant – (1) Agricultural landless labourers families, SC/ST/Small and marginal farmers families = Rs.18,700/- (2) Other families Rs 9350/-

Employment resources grant for productive assets to landless persons – (1) Rs. 49,300/- to landless agricultural labourers, landless SC&ST families (2) Rs 33,150/- to other landless families

Other provisions land for land – Eligible Families losing 25% or more agricultural land will be allotted land for land (minimum 2 ha. and maximum 8 ha.). The major sons of such families will also be allotted minimum 2 ha. of land or equivalent amount of SRP.

Transportation grant – Free transportation or Rs. 5,000/- for transportation of their house hold goods to new R&R site

Residential plots – 90’ X 60’= 5400 Sq. ft. plot or Rs.50000/- to each family in rural area. For urban R&R site the plot size of 40’ X 60’= 2400 Sq. ft. or Rs.50,000/-. Joint Families refusing the residential plot will have to take at least 1 plot minimum.

Stamp/registration fee – For purchase of Agriculture land or immovable property within M.P. up to the limits of amount paid to PAFs (excluding transportation grant)

Special Provisions – (i) Option of acquiring total agriculture land if 75% of land holdings are acquired (ii) Compensation of encroached land if encroachment is prior to 13th April 1987. (iii) Major sons & major unmarried daughters

Criticism of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy:

1. The majority of those displaced require formal land titles in order to apply for compensation. Many of those who do not have formal land titles end up in urban slums.
   
2. There is not enough agricultural land to compensate the displaced with. The displaced have mostly been resettled in unfertile lands, or in inadequate housing.
   

   The ruins of Chimalkhedi village. People from this village were relocated to sheds. (Source: Dana Clark)

3. Resettlement colonies are, more often than not, poorly built. There have also been reports of food security risks given that families that were dependent on subsistence agriculture are not able to practice agriculture anymore.
   

   A house in a resettlement colony in Maharashtra. (Source: Kayana Szymczak)

4. Trying to monetarily compensate a family between Rs. 9000 and 19000 is not adequate when considering that they have lost their traditional livelihoods and culture (which is likely tied to the land).
5. Compensation is provided for people who qualify for the ‘Project Affected’ group. This group largely consists of people who live/lived in the submergence zone of the SSP and does not necessarily include those who live downstream of the dam, or those just outside the submergence zone who are facing problems with waterlogging and salinization of their agricultural lands.
   

   Houses close to rising waters. Do people living in these areas qualify for compensation? (Source: Dana Clark)

6. These policies perpetuate the idea that compensation is monetary and that money is an appropriate indicator of modernity, development and improvement.

The Backlash

As any civil disobedience movement, the NBA has faced criticism from a variety of individuals and organizations.

Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, Gujarat was in a state of drought. The SSP was seen as a measure taken by the Gujarat government to ensure water security during a time of scarcity. The government tried to mobilize support for the dam by labeling the NBA as anti-Gujarat and anti-development.

A recent drought in the Kutch-Saurashtra region (source)

On a broader level though, the NBA has been criticized for romanticizing the controversy. This accusation has taken 2 forms: romanticizing collaboration and romanticizing the lives of indigenous people and peasants. First, the NBA was a platform on which social activists and NGOs were coming together. Their collaborations were seen as a strategy to capture media attention rather than to build any sort of mass-backing. This criticism may have come too soon seeing that the NBA has become famous for being a transnational movement which has the support of NGOs located in countries ranging from the USA to Japan. The NBAs ability to gain mass support is particularly reflected by the rally that was held in Harsud, Madhya Pradesh which mobilized tens of thousands of people and attracted the attention and solidarity of NGOs from across India and the globe.

Dutch support for the NBA (source)

The criticism that the NBA had romanticized the lives of indigenous groups and peasants is an issue of social justice. Rawls’ theory of social justice, derived from utilitarian theories of justice, suggests that social justice involves elements of:

1. freedom of thought
2. liberty of conscience
3. political liberties
4. freedom of association
5. freedoms which encourage liberty and integrity

The NBA, in their movement, made the assumption that the farmers wanted to remain tied to their traditional livelihoods and their lands. Although this may have very well been the case, the romanticization of rural life completely disregards the hardships that these rural populations faced with poverty, climate, discrimination before the project commenced. As per Rawl’s definition, these indigenous groups and peasants have the right to not want to be tied to their traditional livelihoods, to seek external employment, to leave their lands for urban areas. In addition, they also have the right to reap the benefits of development. The SSP is a form of development – it will provide electricity and water and potentially new employment opportunities with the industries it attracts.

The NBA’s radicalism has also been criticized by NGOs such as ARCH-Vahini as irresponsible activism. This criticism mainly stems from the notion that it is impractical and idealistic to think that the government will halt the SSP altogether. ARCH-Vahini, and similar NGOs felt it was more important to deal with the immediate struggle which was the compensation of those displaced. In addition, the idea of NBA’s activism as irresponsible is largely due to the usage of the issue of rehabilitation a part of the fight against dam construction. ARCH-Vahini, here, may have been concerned that ensuring rehabilitation and stopping dam construction are two fundamentally different goals, and that the shift in focus may reduce pressure on the government to enforce adequate rehabilitation and resettlement policies.

NBA volunteers pulling out drowned pilgrims in Dharaji (source). Is the NBA too radical?

Narmada Bachao Andolan!

The Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), or Save the Narmada, is one of the most famous and prevailing social justice movements in the world. Under the leadership of social activists such as Medha Patkar, they have mobilized hundreds of thousands of people, challenged the government, and garnered the support of international and national organizations and institutions.

Medha Patkar (source)

As mentioned in my earlier post, the NBA was formed due to dissatisfaction with the resettlement and rehabilitation reforms. The NBA is a ‘new’ social movement as per Dwivedi’s (1998, see attachment below) definition. These new movements have 3 elements:

1. resisting and stopping economic developments which adversely affect the environment and local communities
2. redefining development, economic values, technological efficiency, and scientific rationality
3. fighting ‘narrowly conceived’ development projects which have serious socio-ecological impacts and will only benefit the wealthy minority

The NBA was and is still resisting the SSP, calling for a complete stop in construction. They have also tried to redefine values by reorienting the anti-movement to protesting the lack of government transparency of information on the dam and is potential socio-ecological consequences. Therefore, the broader issue in question is the right to information.

The NBA has demanded answers to the following questions (Dwivedi 1998):

• who will the development actually benefit?
• who does the development belong to?
• what is the cost(s)?
• who will pay these costs?
• do the costs outweigh the benefits?
• is the development just?
• is the project in the nation’s interests?
• how has decision-making been used?
• is adequate compensation possible?

The NBA accused the government of having planned the displacement and not having informed those affected about it beforehand, even though the provision of that information is required by law. The movement also argued that those displaced had not been involved in the planning process of the SSP or been allowed to participate in the project as a livelihood alternative.

The SSP was “narrowly conceived”, evident from the inadequate compensatory and rehabilitation policies and the lack of consideration of long-term consequences to the environment and livelihoods of people dependent on it. The SSP, to a large degree, benefits the wealthy minority, evident by government–backing of wealthy farmers and reports that much of the water is being diverted to industrial use rather than public use.

The NBA has utilized a variety of methods to protest the SSP including road and traffic blockades, public meetings, hunger strikes, petitions, demonstrations, and non-violent occupations of villages and homes in submergence areas. A particularly successful protest that the NBA conducted was the rally in Harsud, a town in Madhya Pradesh that was to be submerged. During this rally, the NBA mobilized over 60,000 people (activists, adivasis, and peasants) to protest the submergence of Harsud. This rally attracted the support of citizen’s groups from across India and NGOs abroad and resulted in a new, collective mission to resist destructive development. The Harsud rally made the NBA a household name in India and a media staple.

The NBA intensified its struggle between 1990 and 1993 and focused their efforts getting the World Bank to retract its $450 million loan for the SSP. The NBA networked extensively to garner the support of foreign NGOs and political institutions that had the power and means to approach and pressurize the World Bank. In one particularly dramatic situation, the Japanese government withdrew a $150 million loan to the World Bank due to the World Bank’s inadequate assessment of the socio-ecological impacts of the SSP.

Pressure on the World Bank continued to increase and caused them to appoint and Independent Review Commission (IRC) to evaluate the resettlement and rehabilitation policies and their implementation and also the plans to mitigate the environmental impacts of the SSP. The Morse Report, submitted by the IRC in 1992, determined that the existing resettlement and rehabilitation policies and efforts to assess the environmental impacts of the SSP were inadequate. The Morse report caused the World Bank to rescind its contract with the Indian government in March 1993. A few months later, the Indian government agreed to formally review the SSP and allow the NBA’s involvement in the process. Despite these developments, the government decided to continue with the SSP with the use of national financial resources.

The NBA’s greatest successes occurred between 1990 and 1993 with the withdrawal of the World Bank, the Harsud Rally, and so on. Its momentum has dwindled since then, largely because people are convinced that the SSP will continue no matter what given the Indian government’s conviction to let the SSP continue. Despite this, Medha Patkar and the NBA continue to protest the SSP.

Rally in Khandwa, November 2008. (source)

Protesters neck-deep in water (source)

Dwivedi (1998) paper

A Burgeoning Social Movement

The Narmada Valley Project is predicted to displace 1.5 million people from their lands. It is thought that the SSP alone will “submerge 248 village, displace over 3,00,000 people, and destroy 40,000 hectares of land”. Displacement means the loss of culture, the loss of land, and the destruction of livelihoods.

Submergence and displacement in the Narmada River (source)

The beginning of the SSP in 1985 marked the birth of the now 27-year-old social justice movement, Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). The NBA, led by Medha Patkar, was  formed to bring together existing national social movements and to provide adivasis (indigenous peoples) and other affected groups with a platform to protest the dams. The NBA was preceded by several different social justice movements which really set the stone for the formation of the NBA. This blog post will focus on these precursory movements.

But first, how do we define a social movement? According to Dwivedi (1998, see attachment below), a social movement has three components: social conflict, collective action, and/or political protest. The movements, especially in the global south, largely arise because of systemic or structural failures in poorly planned and implemented development projects which are  These movements function by:

1. creating and using extensive networks of social relationships
2. forming a collective identity
3. producing new systems of knowledge

The first movement was launched in 1977 when villagers from Nimad and Dhar, Madhya Pradesh launched the Narmada Bachao-Nimad Bachao Sangharsh Samiti (Save Narmada, Save Nimad Struggle Committee). This particular coalition was formed to protest and renegotiate the dam’s final height as a means to prevent the submergence of some of the villages in the Nimad. The first stages of the movement were primarily concerned with ensuring that displaced populations were properly compensated and rehabilitated, and not protesting the dam as a whole.

By the 1980s, the movement had piqued the interest of environmentalists and environmental groups which had been involved in the Chipko and Silent Valley movements. Environmental groups and non-governmental organizations such as Kalpavriksh and ARCH-Vahini began researching and reporting on the environmental problems, information inadequacies and health and displacement concerns pertaining to the SSP. The work of these groups forced the World Bank to commission a study on the displacement and resettlement of those in the vicinity of the SSP. The resulting report provided damning evidence about the shortfalls of rehabilitation plans and caused several international NGOs to pressurize the World Bank into reconsidering the loan it was negotiating with the Indian Government. Despite this report, the World Bank provided the government with a $450 million loan for the SSP.

Between 1984 and 1987, groups such as the Narmada Asargrasta Samiti, Narmada Dharangrasta Samiti, Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath, and the Narmada Ghati Nav Nirman Samiti rose to prominence and intensified their protests regarding the Indian Government’s lackluster rehabilitation policies. These movements networked extensively by creating connections with groups and organizations ranging from village councils to international NGOs. Their collective identity, or their shared value, consisted of ensuring that displaced populations were properly rehabilitated. And finally, they attempted to produce new systems of knowledge by working with tribal villages to determine what rehabilitation the displaced needed and wanted, what rehabilitation they had been provided by the government, and whether or not that rehabilitation was satisfactory.

In 1988, a dramatic split occurred in the NGOs that had been working together. The Gujarat government announced resettlement and rehabilitation policy reforms. Some NGOs lauded the government and others were so disheartened that they shifted their focus. Their shift in focus stemmed from their belief that that the land for land policy, which mandates that people who lose land from development projects are to be compensated with land elsewhere, and other recently modified resettlement and rehabilitation reforms would not and could not be implemented. The shift was also caused by the fact that the government had not commissioned any rigorous environmental impact assessments of the SSP, potentially given its high cost to benefit ratio. Those that underwent this shift formed the radical Narmada Bachao Andolan.

Dwivedi 1998 paper

An Ecological Disaster?

The states responsible for the development of SSP have been heavily criticized for not having conducted adequate environmental impact analyses prior to starting dam construction. This is despite the fact that the Central Water Commission (CWC) guidelines state that:

“The planning, construction and operation of irrigation/ hydroelectric/ multi purpose projects have considerable impacts on navigation, fish culture, wild life, recreational aspects and overall ecology of the affected regions. Some of these aspects on the ecology of the region as well as the overall environment are irreversible in nature. It is, therefore, necessary that a careful evaluation is made of these impacts, whether good or bad …”

So what are the predicted ecological impacts of the SSP alone? The impacts include a combination of upstream, downstream, command center and resettlement zone impacts. The following impacts are largely speculative given that relatively few quantitative studies have been conducted:

1. Forests – It has been calculated that the SSP reservoir will submerge 39,134 hectares of land of which 35.1% is forest. The destruction of forest is expected to result in a considerable loss of wildlife habitat and floral and faunal biodiversity. In addition, it is expected to affect 474 villages and 66,675 people who either live on forest lands or depend on the forest for their livelihoods. And where will these people move? To other forests. It has been reported that in Maharashtra alone, over 4200 hectares of forest have been released for rehabilitation and resettlement. Such a move is likely to increase pressures on the natural resources provided by those forests.

A submerged village, July 2003 (source)

2. Aquatic, riverine and estuarine ecosystems – Although no comprehensive surveys have been conducted on the biodiversity of the Narmada River, it has been predicted that the dam’s upstream impacts include loss of breeding grounds, declining fish populations, and declining populations of endangered species such as freshwater crocodiles. In addition, dramatic changes in the composition, volume and seasonality of downstream river flows will likely affect prawn fisheries and other aquatic life, increase the likelihood of flash floods, and decrease land fertility. A reduction in downstream water flow also has the potential to increase the salinity of estuarine waters which can negatively affect floral and faunal species. Decreasing fish populations will generally adversely affect the livelihoods of fisherfolk from surrounding communities.

3. Catchment area – The dam’s catchment area is likely to face premature siltation which will reduce the amount of usable water in the reservoir. Siltation is when particulate matter such as silt or clay pollutes water. In the context of SSP, siltation will likely be caused by increased soil erosion as a result of deforestation of the catchment area. Interestingly, the siltation of the catchment area will reduce the lifespan of the reservoir.

Silt build-up on the banks of the Narmada (source)

4. Command area – The command area is the area around the dam over which the direct benefits of the dam such as irrigation, electricity, water supply, etc reach. The biggest environmental problems that are likely to be caused by the SSP in the command area are waterlogging and salinzation which will in turn result in severe land degradation. The command area is primarily composed of black soils which have a high water retention capacity, making them especially prone to waterlogging. Salinization of the land occurs when water accumulates (partly from waterlogging) and dissolves the salt from soil particles – when the water evaporates, a layer of salt is left above the soil. A more detailed explanation of land salinization can be found here. Gujarat is expect to face the brunt of this, where over half the over half the area to be irrigated is prone to waterlogging and salinization, potentially resulting in a loss of about one million acres of agricultural land.

Waterlogged agricultural land in the command area of the SSP (source)

5. Diseases – The incidences of waterborne diseases such as malaria are expected to increase due to the presence of stagnant water and waterlogged lands.

As per the Planning Commission’s rules, a project can only be sanctioned if the cost-benefit ratio is 1 to 1.5. In 1987, the costs of building SSP were projected at Rs. 90,000,000,000; it was reported that the project will cost Rs. 700,000,000,000 in 2012. Including the environmental cost of forest submergence alone was predicted in 1987 to add a further Rs. 81,900,000,000 to the building cost. The environmental cost is likely to have significantly increased since 1987 given developments in the ecosystem services valuation process and inclusion of ignored impacts such as loss of wildlife, waterlogging, salinization, etc.

Is it, therefore, really possible that the SSP can provide a relative benefit given the astronomical environmental costs associated with the project? So far, the SSP has not been able to even achieve its original aims:

1. the irrigation potential of the dam was projected to be a whooping 1,792,000 hectares in Gujurat, however the potential has “stagnated” at 153,000 hectares due to delays in the construction of canal networks
2. drinking water benefits are only at 29-33% of realized potential as much of the water originally allocated for domestic use has been diverted for industrial use; in Gujarat only 7-10% of the available water is being used
3. power generation in 2006-2007 was 3,601 million units (MU) and 4,435 MU in 2007-2008, inconsistent with a dam height of 121.92 meters. It has been estimated that the SSP upon completion will only generate 50 megawatts (MW) of power, a far cry from the 1450 MW promised.

These shortcomings suggest that the proponents of the SSP greatly exaggerated its benefits and that its benefits do not outweigh its ecological costs. Based on this, is it unfair to consider the SSP an ecological disaster?

A History

The Narmada River has been the center of controversy ever since talks of damming it started in the mid-1940s. Since then, the government has planned to build no less than 3200 dams across the length of the river as a means of harnessing its water resources potential, making it the largest river development project in India. Given that India has a one billion strong and still growing population and a skyrocketing demand for water, food and electricity, why has this project stirred so much controversy from the get-go?

The Narmada River is 1312 kilometers long and spans 3 Indian states, flowing from the Maikala Range in Madhya Pradesh, through Maharashtra and into the Gulf of Khambhat in Gujurat which empties into the Arabian Sea.

Location of the Narmada River in India (source)

The Narmada river and its tributaries form the Narmada Basin which drains 37,542 square miles, or 98,795 square kilometers, of land. According to the Narmada Valley Development Authority (NVDA), Madhya Pradesh houses 87% of the basin, Maharashtra 2%, and Gujarat 11%. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) estimates that the river would be able to irrigate 15 million acres, or 6 million hectares, of land and generate 3000 megawatts of hydroelectric power upon full development.

The Narmada River Valley’s water resources potential was recognized by the British in the early 1900s. The Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission first proposed damming the Narmada river for the purposes of irrigation between 1945 and 1946. However, disputes between Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan concerning the sharing of development costs and the dams’ resources stalled damming plans until 1969. In 1969, the NWDT was formed and by 1979, the NWDT had allocated shares of water and power between the four states. Madhya Pradesh would receive the highest share of water and electricity (65%) and Maharashtra, the lowest (1%).

Locations of the 30 biggest dams along the Narmada Basin. (source)

Of all the ongoing and proposed dam projects on the Narmada River, the largest and most famed is the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) in Navagam, Gujarat. SSP was first proposed in 1957. The original plan was to build the dam to a height of 160 ft in the first phase and increase it to 320 ft in the second phase so that water could reach Kutch and Saurashtra, both parts of Gujarat. Although the foundation stone of the SSP was laid on April 5, 1961 by Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru,  construction did not begin until many years later, partly due to inter-state disagreements regarding the dam’s final height. In 1974, the NWDP finally set the height of the dam at 455 ft.Construction of SSP commenced in 1987 with the support of a $450 million loan from the World Bank (granted in 1985).

The beginning of the SSP marked the birth of the now 27-year-old social justice movement, Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). The NBA was formed to bring together existing national social movements and challenge the inadequate resettlement and rehabilitation plans in place for displaced communities. Mounting pressure from the NBA and other international and national opposition groups strong-armed the World Bank into putting together an independent review of the project. The resulting evaluation, the Morse Report, was blunt in its assessment of the social and environmental repercussions of the SSP and caused the World Bank to pull out of the Narmada River in 1993.

Regardless, the construction and implementation of the SSP, although still plagued by dispute, has continued to this day with the support of domestic funding. The scale of the Narmada Valley Project (NVP) and the controversy surrounding it makes it a relevant and pressing environmental issue, especially considering that similar projects in developing countries, i.e. the Three Gorges Dam, are making headway. My hope with this blog is to use the SSP case study as a means to document the environmental and social impacts of damming the Narmada River, evaluate the success of social activists and social movements such as the NBA and overall understand the NVP from a larger political context.

The Sardar Sarovar Dam (source)